Unit 3 of 4 · M.Com Sem 1

Unit 3: Probability distributions, LP and game theory

Quantitative Techniques notes · PTU syllabus (MCOP103-18)

4 min read5 topics10 exam questions
On this page
  1. Unit summary
  2. Binomial, Poisson and normal distributions
  3. Linear programming: formulation and graphical method
  4. Simplex method, artificial variables and Big-M
  5. Degeneracy, duality and post-optimality analysis
  6. Game theory: two-person zero-sum games
  7. Key terms
  8. Quick revision
  9. Important questions

Unit summary

Probability distributions model uncertainty; linear programming and game theory support optimal decisions. This unit covers the Binomial, Poisson and Normal distributions, formulation of LP problems, graphical and simplex (Big-M) solutions, degeneracy, duality and post-optimality analysis, and two-person zero-sum games with pure and mixed strategies, dominance and graphical solutions.

After this unit you can

  • Apply Binomial, Poisson and Normal distributions
  • Formulate and solve LPPs by graphical and simplex methods
  • Explain degeneracy, duality and post-optimality (sensitivity) analysis
  • Solve two-person zero-sum games including graphical solutions

PTU syllabus topics

  • Binomial
  • Poisson and Normal distributions with properties and applications
  • formulation of linear programming problems
  • graphic and Simplex (including Big-M) solution methods
  • degeneracy
  • duality
  • post-optimality analysis
  • two-person zero-sum games
  • pure and mixed strategies
  • dominance rule
  • graphic solution to games
ProcessSimplex method steps
  1. 1Standard form

    Add slack, surplus, artificial variables

  2. 2Initial table

    Basic feasible solution

  3. 3Key column

    Most negative Cj − Zj (max problem)

  4. 4Key row

    Minimum ratio test

  5. 5Pivot and iterate

    Until no improvement is possible

1

Topic 1

Binomial, Poisson and normal distributions

ComparisonProbability distributions
Binomial
Poisson

Use

Fixed n trials, two outcomes, constant p

Rare events in an interval

Formula

P(r) = nCr pʳ qⁿ⁻ʳ

P(r) = e⁻ᵐ mʳ / r!

Mean

np

m

Variance

npq

m

Normal distribution: a continuous, bell-shaped, symmetric distribution with mean = median = mode. Probabilities are found with Z = (X − μ)/σ and the normal table. About 68.27% of values lie within μ ± 1σ, 95.45% within μ ± 2σ and 99.73% within μ ± 3σ.

Example

Marks are normal with μ = 60 and σ = 10. For X = 75, Z = 1.5; the area from 0 to 1.5 is 0.4332, so P(X > 75) = 0.5 − 0.4332 = 0.0668 (about 6.7%).

Example

Binomial: 10% of items are defective; in a sample of 5, P(exactly one defective) = 5C1 (0.1)(0.9)⁴ = 5 × 0.1 × 0.6561 = 0.328. Poisson: on average 2 calls a minute; P(no call) = e⁻² = 0.135.

2

Topic 2

Linear programming: formulation and graphical method

Linear programming (LP) optimises a linear objective function subject to linear constraints and non-negativity.

  • Components: decision variables, objective function, constraints, non-negativity.
  • Assumptions: linearity (proportionality, additivity), divisibility, certainty, finiteness.

Example

A firm makes chairs (x) and tables (y). Profit ₹40 and ₹60. Carpentry: 2x + 3y ≤ 120 hours; painting: 2x + y ≤ 80 hours. Maximise Z = 40x + 60y.

ProcessGraphical method
  1. 1Plot each constraint as a line
  2. 2Identify the feasible region
  3. 3Find corner points
  4. 4Evaluate Z at each corner
  5. 5Choose the best value
  • Corner points: (0, 0) Z = 0; (40, 0) Z = 1,600; (0, 40) Z = 2,400; intersection of 2x + 3y = 120 and 2x + y = 80 → y = 20, x = 30 → Z = 1,200 + 1,200 = 2,400. Two corners give the same Z — multiple optimal solutions (objective is parallel to the carpentry constraint).
  • Special cases: multiple optima, unbounded solution, infeasible problem, redundant constraint.
3

Topic 3

Simplex method, artificial variables and Big-M

  • Convert inequalities to equations: add slack (≤), subtract surplus and add artificial variables (≥ or =).
ProcessSimplex method steps
  1. 1

    Standard form with slack/surplus/artificial variables

  2. 2

    Initial basic feasible solution table

  3. 3

    Compute Cj − Zj (net evaluation)

  4. 4

    Entering variable

    Most positive Cj − Zj (maximisation)

  5. 5

    Leaving variable

    Minimum ratio (b ÷ key column, positive only)

  6. 6

    Pivot and update the table

  7. 7

    Repeat until all Cj − Zj ≤ 0 (maximisation)

  • Big-M method: artificial variables are given a very large penalty −M in a maximisation objective (+M for minimisation) so they leave the basis; if an artificial variable remains positive in the final table, the problem is infeasible.
  • Two-phase method: alternative to Big-M — first minimise the sum of artificial variables.
  • Duality: every LP (primal) has a dual; optimal values are equal; dual values give shadow prices of resources.
4

Topic 4

Degeneracy, duality and post-optimality analysis

  • Degeneracy: a basic variable takes the value zero — ties in the minimum ratio; may cause cycling (resolved by perturbation or Bland's rule).
  • Duality: every primal LP has a dual; if the primal maximises with ≤ constraints, the dual minimises with ≥ constraints; the objective values are equal at the optimum; dual variables = shadow prices (value of one more unit of a resource).
ComparisonPrimal vs dual
Primal (max)
Dual (min)

Variables

n decision variables

m dual variables (one per constraint)

Constraints

m constraints (≤)

n constraints (≥)

Objective coefficients

Become right-hand sides of the dual

Right-hand sides of the primal

Optimum

Max Z

Min W = Max Z

  • Post-optimality (sensitivity) analysis: how the optimal solution changes with changes in objective coefficients, right-hand-side values (resources) or constraint coefficients — ranges of optimality and feasibility.

Example

If the shadow price of machine hours is ₹30, buying an extra hour for less than ₹30 increases profit — useful for capacity decisions.

5

Topic 5

Game theory: two-person zero-sum games

A game is a competitive situation where the gain of one player is the loss of the other (zero-sum).

  • Terms: players, strategies (pure or mixed), payoff matrix (from the row player's view), value of the game, saddle point.
  • Saddle point: an element that is the minimum of its row and the maximum of its column — maximin = minimax; both players use pure strategies.
ProcessSolving a game
  1. 1Check for a saddle point

    Pure strategies if maximin = minimax

  2. 2Apply dominance

    Remove dominated rows/columns

  3. 32 × 2 without saddle point

    Odds/algebraic method for mixed strategies

  4. 42 × n or m × 2

    Graphical method or sub-games

  5. 5Larger games

    Linear programming

Key formulas2 × 2 mixed strategy (matrix [a b; c d])
  • Probability A plays row 1

    p = (d − c) ÷ [(a + d) − (b + c)]

  • Probability B plays column 1

    q = (d − b) ÷ [(a + d) − (b + c)]

  • Value of the game

    V = (ad − bc) ÷ [(a + d) − (b + c)]

Example

Matrix [3 −1; −2 4]: no saddle point. Denominator = (3 + 4) − (−1 − 2) = 10. p = (4 + 2) ÷ 10 = 0.6; q = (4 + 1) ÷ 10 = 0.5; V = (12 − 2) ÷ 10 = 1.

  • Dominance rule: a row that is ≤ another row in every column (for the maximising player) can be deleted; a column ≥ another column (for the minimising player) can be deleted.

Graphical solution of 2 × n and m × 2 games

  • For a 2 × n game, plot each column's expected payoff as a line against the row player's probability p (0 to 1); the highest point of the lower envelope (maximin) gives the optimal p and value; the two lines meeting there form a 2 × 2 sub-game solved by the formula.
  • For an m × 2 game, use the lowest point of the upper envelope (minimax).

Key terms

Poisson distribution
Distribution for the number of rare events in an interval
Shadow price
Increase in the objective value from one extra unit of a resource
Degeneracy
A basic variable at zero value in an LP solution
Dual
The associated LP problem derived from the primal
Dominance
Removing inferior strategies to simplify a game

Quick revision

  • Binomial np, npq; Poisson m, m; normal Z = (X − μ)/σ.
  • LP: formulation, graphical corner points, simplex and Big-M.
  • Duality: equal optimum values; shadow prices.
  • Sensitivity analysis: ranges of optimality and feasibility.
  • Games: saddle point, dominance, 2 × 2 formula, graphical method.

Important exam questions

Practice questions written to the PTU exam pattern for this unit's syllabus: short answers (Section A style) and long answers (Sections B and C style).

Short-answer questions

  1. Q1.State the properties of the normal distribution.
  2. Q2.When is the Poisson distribution used?
  3. Q3.What is a shadow price?
  4. Q4.What is degeneracy in LP?
  5. Q5.What is post-optimality analysis?
  6. Q6.What is a saddle point?

Long-answer questions

  1. Q1.Explain Binomial, Poisson and Normal distributions with examples.
  2. Q2.Formulate and solve an LPP by the simplex method.
  3. Q3.Explain duality and sensitivity analysis in LP.
  4. Q4.Explain the solution of two-person zero-sum games including the graphical method.

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